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The  current  review  and  synthesis  was  designed  to provocatively  develop  and  evaluate  the  proposition  that
“fear of the  unknown  may  be a, or possibly  the, fundamental  fear”  (Carleton,  2016)  underlying  anxiety  and
therein  neuroticism.  Identifying  fundamental  transdiagnostic  elements  is  a priority  for clinical  theory  and
practice. Historical  criteria  for identifying  fundamental  components  of  anxiety  are  described  and  revised
criteria  are  offered.  The  revised  criteria  are  based  on logical  rhetorical  arguments  using  a  constituenteywords:
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reductionist  postpositivist  approach  supported  by  the  available  empirical  data.  The  revised  criteria  are
then  used  to assess  several  fears posited  as  fundamental,  including  fear  of  the  unknown.  The  review  and
synthesis  concludes  with brief  recommendations  for  future  theoretical  discourse  as  well  as  clinical  and
non-clinical  research.
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undamental fears
. Introduction
One fear to rule them all, one fear to ﬁnd them, one fear to bring
hem all and in the black box bind them. The pastiche of Tolkien’s
ext (1954) represents an ideal place to begin a review and synthe-
is designed to provocatively develop and evaluate the proposition
hat “fear of the unknown may  be a, or possibly the, fundamental
ear” underlying anxiety and therein neuroticism (Carleton, 2016;
. 39). Fear of the unknown (FOTU) will be deﬁned herein as, “an
ndividual’s propensity to experience fear caused by the perceived
bsence of information at any level of consciousness or point of pro-
essing”; relatedly, intolerance of uncertainty (IU) will be deﬁned
s, “an individual’s dispositional incapacity to endure the aver-
ive response triggered by the perceived absence of salient, key,
r sufﬁcient information, and sustained by the associated percep-
ion of uncertainty.” (Carleton, 2016; p. 31). The paper begins with
 brief historical overview of anxiety determinants and hierarchical
odels for anxiety and fear. The original criteria for fundamental
ears are presented as foundations for contemporary revisions. The
evised criteria are then used to assess several fears posited as fun-
amental, including fear of the unknown. The paper concludes with
rief recommendations for future theoretical discourse as well as
linical and non-clinical research.E-mail address: Nick.Carleton@uregina.ca
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.janxdis.2016.03.011
887-6185/© 2016 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article unlicense  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1.1. Determining anxiety
Psychologists have sought fundamental determinants of cog-
nitions, behaviours, personalities, and pathologies since Wundt.
Contemporary textbooks describe psychology as a science dedi-
cated to understanding the multiple determinants of cognitions,
behaviours, and emotions (e.g., Gerrig, Zimbardo, Desmarais, &
Ivanco, 2011; Lilienfeld et al., 2015). Many psychologists rely on
a constituent reductionist postpositivist philosophy of science in
such efforts; oversimpliﬁed, the approach identiﬁes increasingly
fundamental components of a construct (i.e., constituent reduc-
tionism), without ignoring the emergent properties, and while
accepting an underlying reality that can be measured or understood
by progressive but imperfect approximations (i.e., postpositivism).
Identifying fundamental components has broadly beneﬁted many
scientiﬁc ﬁelds (e.g., chemistry, biology, physics). Such practices
ﬁt well with structuralism and functionalism (Munger, 2003), and
Gestalt researchers acknowledge progressive reductionism as ben-
eﬁcial, caveating costs to understanding complex whole systems
(Humphrey, 1924a, 1924b). Accordingly, many psychologists have
applied similar practices to understanding and modifying cogni-
tions, emotions, and behaviours.
Theorists from Freud (Breuer & Freud, 1974; Freud, 1924), to
Spielberger (1975), to Barlow (2000, 2002), have suggested individ-
ual differences make some people more likely to experience fear or
anxiety. The tendency to respond with fear or to experience perva-
sive anxiety was called neuroticism by Freud and trait anxiety by
Spielberger. Spielberger (1972) described anxiety as “psychobio-
logical” (p.489) and “extremely complex and involve[ing] a number
of different measurable components” (Spielberger, 1975; p. 139).
der the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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e posited an interaction between exposure to stressors, appraisals
f stressors (in line with Scherer, 2009), and a recursive interac-
ivity between experiences of state and trait anxiety (in line with
cherer & Brosch, 2009). Spielberger (1975) further suggested com-
onents of anxiety “should be independently conceptualized and
perationally measured as critical variables in a state-trait theory
f anxiety” (p. 139). In other words, anxiety was not fundamental1
nto itself, and Spielberger underscored the differentiation of state
nd trait anxiety was only the beginning of understanding anxiety.
Theorists have since supported a constituent reductionist post-
ositivist approach to understanding trait anxiety (Barlow, Ellard,
auer-Zavala, Bullis, & Carl, 2014; Barlow, Sauer-Zavala, Carl, Bullis,
 Ellard, 2014; Brown & Barlow, 2009; Cuijpers et al., 2010; Lahey,
009), particularly when used synonymously with constructs like
euroticism (Ormel, Rosmalen, & Farmer, 2004). Such synonymous
sage has led prominent theorists to argue the functional equiva-
ency of several constructs related to trait anxiety. For example,
agan and Snidman (2004) clarify that inhibited and uninhibited
o the unfamiliar temperament categories refer to introverted and
xtraverted, respectively. Barlow and colleagues (Barlow, Sauer-
avala et al., 2014) argue the same two categories respectively
efer to trait anxiety and negative affect, as well as positive affect.
lark and Beck (2010) argued trait anxiety is “. . .so closely related
o negative emotionality (i.e., Neuroticism or Negative Affect) that
he two are considered almost synonymous” (p.104). If (1) neu-
oticism by any name is a higher-order biopsychosocial construct
hat is facilitated by fear of potentially recurring aversive experi-
nces (Barlow, 2000); (2) fear is distinguished from anxiety by being
resent-oriented and relatively certain, rather than future-oriented
nd relatively uncertain (Barlow, 2000); (3) proliﬁc anxiety deﬁnes
euroticism (Barlow, Sauer-Zavala et al., 2014); and (4) fear “is the
asic cognitive process underlying all anxiety disorders” (Clark &
eck, 2010, p. 29), then a hierarchical structure identifying increas-
ngly fundamental fears offers several potential advantages; for
xample, informing and being informed by psychological theories
f evolution, emotion, cognition, development, personality, and
ecision-making.
. Hierarchical models of fears
Initial hierarchical models for neuroticism, fears, and phobias
ere based on evidence from researching learning. That evidence
nderscored neuroticism as learned and, therein, governed by
he laws of learning (Eysenck, 1966). Following that premise,
achman (1977) posited a fear acquisition model that implicated
onditioning, vicarious exposure (i.e., observational learning), and
nformation transmission (i.e., didactics), which accumulated sig-
iﬁcant support (e.g., Muris, Merckelbach, de Jong, & Ollendick,
002; Rachman, 1991).
Contemporary fear acquisition models (see for review, Armﬁeld,
006; Coelho & Purkis, 2009; Mallan, Lipp, & Cochrane, 2013)
ssume cognitive or emotional factors underlie fear responses
Coelho & Purkis, 2009); however, interactions between naturally
elected predispositions and environmental variables remain crit-
cal for fear acquisition (Coelho & Purkis, 2009; p. 343). In line
ith contemporary appraisal models of emotion (Moors, 2009),
here may  be evolutionarily-supported fears prepared or inherited
i.e., requiring little or no learning) based on biological substrates.
hose fears, in conjunction with environmental inﬂuences (e.g.,
irect or indirect learning), might explain all fear acquisition and,
herein, neuroticism. That said, arguments for cohesive sets of stim-
li as biologically prepared (e.g., snakes, spiders) are supported by
1 “serving as, or being an essential part of, a foundation or basis; basic; underlying”
“fundamental,” n.d.). Disorders 41 (2016) 5–21
some evidence (e.g., Cook & Mineka, 1989; Ohman & Mineka, 2001;
Poulton & Menzies, 2002b; Waters, Lipp, & Randhawa, 2011), but
confounded by others.
Certain fears, such as the fear of spiders, are frequently referred
to as “biologically prepared.” However, only approximately 200
species of spiders worldwide can cause severe human envenom-
ing, out of the more than 30,000 species of spiders (Diaz, 2004).
The contrary is true of mushrooms, which are usually viewed
as not biologically relevant to fear. Nevertheless, some mush-
rooms, such as the Amanita phalloides,  are one of the toxic agents
most responsible for fatal cases in Poland (Kotwica & Czerczak,
2007), and unintentional poisoning with plants is common in
small children (Eddleston & Persson, 2003). Approximately 100
species of poisonous mushrooms have been identiﬁed in the
United States alone (Lincoff & Mitchel, 1977), which makes it
reasonable to suspect that mushrooms have posed a greater
threat to the survival of the human species than have spiders
and snakes combined (Delprato, 1980). (Coelho & Purkis, 2009,
p. 342)
The challenge may  be partially resolved by considering whether
the cohesive stimuli sets are biologically prepared, or the elements
therein. Fear of snakes has been argued as innate for primates
(e.g., Hebb, 1949); however, 6-month-old infants show no fear of
snakes because the fear has not yet been learned (Kagan & Snidman,
2004); in contrast, 4-month-old infants broadly demonstrate fear
responses to unfamiliar stimuli (Kagan & Snidman, 2004). Snakes
may  become more likely to produce fear because, relative to other
more frequently encountered stimuli, snakes have unfamiliar skin,
body shape, and movement patterns (Kagan & Snidman, 2004), all
of which speaks more to a biological preparedness for unknowns
(Carleton, 2016), or other elements of the stimulus, than to the
cohesive stimulus itself. There are also more unknowns associ-
ated with encountering a snake than a mushroom, not the least of
which being the snake moves quickly whereas the mushroom does
not–a potentially critical element underscored in looming models
(Riskind, 1997).
Recent research comparing responses to snakes and ﬂowers
demonstrated that novelty (i.e., the unknown; Carleton, 2016)
was the key element for activation of the amygdala, with no evi-
dence of a novelty by stimulus interaction (Balderston, Schultz, &
Helmstetter, 2013); however, neurological responses subsequent
to the amygdala (e.g., hippocampal responses) did evidence per-
ception of the snake as more threatening. As such, appraisals of
associated cues–knowns and unknowns–can dramatically inﬂu-
ence fear (Carleton, 2016). For example, a planned encounter with
a snake secured behind glass might be less fear provoking than
being told your meal contains mushrooms of ambiguous origin.
Similarly, as recently synthesized by Carleton (2016), theorists have
argued that appraised elements, context, and the relative number
of unknowns, may  be the critical determinants of an emotional
response.
For example, what is it that water phobic individuals react to?
Clearly it is not water per se as they likely seek water to drink, to
bathe in, and to nourish their plants. Is it deep water? If so, how
deep is deep enough? Or is it water in which they might drown,
or in which they might not be able to negotiate their way to
safety? These later two possibilities sound rather like cognitive
processes at work. At least for adults, it appears that such reac-
tions are somehow bound up with perception and cognition of
certain stimulus elements. (Kleinknecht, 2002; p. 162)Contemporary fear acquisition models argue fear and anxiety
involves context, appraisal, learning, scaffolding, or generalization
of stimuli and responses (Coelho & Purkis, 2009); nevertheless,
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(i.e., Anderson, Hildreth, & Howland, 2015), which was  based on
a second article from the same result set (Baumeister &Leary,R.N. Carleton / Journal of A
ince Spielberger (1972) and Rachman (1977), fears described
s effectively unconditioned have been posited and referred to
s basic, evolutionarily-supported, fundamental, inherent, innate,
on-associative, predisposed, or prepared. There is evidence sup-
orting such fears (Poulton & Menzies, 2002b) as congruent with
earning models (Poulton & Menzies, 2002a). There are theorists
ho argue that unequivocal and deﬁnitive evidence for any fear
s unlearned is impossible (e.g., Muris et al., 2002; Rachman,
991); however, others argue for nearly innate fears (e.g., Mineka
 Ohman, 2002), and still others argue that models of emotion
nd anxiety explicitly posit at least one category of stimuli, the
nknown, as innately facilitating a fear response (see for review,
arleton, 2016).
. The original fundamental fears
In 1991, Reiss explicated a logical, constituent reductionist, post
ositivist method for identifying key cognitive elements of anxiety,
hich he called fundamental fears. Reiss (1991) used a variant of
he downward arrow technique to argue:
Fundamental fears provide reasons for fearing a wide range of
stimuli, whereas ordinary fears do not have this characteristic.
For example, consider the rational relationships among three
different fears: (a) the fear of snakes; (b) the fear of heights;
and (c) the fear of anxiety. Fears of snakes and heights are ratio-
nally unrelated to one another in the sense that having one of
the fears is not a reason for having the other fear. It makes no
sense for a person to say, “I am afraid of heights because I am
afraid of snakes.” On the other hand, the fear of anxiety is ratio-
nally related to the fear of snakes and heights. A rational person
might say, “I am afraid of snakes and heights because I am afraid
I would have a panic attack if I encountered those stimuli.” A
person who is unusually afraid of (or sensitive to) the possibil-
ity of a panic attack holds a reason for potentially fearing snakes,
heights, or any other situation that might be expected to lead to
panic. (Reiss, 1991, p. 147)
Reiss’ revised theor (Reiss, 1997) posited a hierarchical structure
hat placed anxiety sensitivity (AS), the fear of negative evaluation
FNE), and the fear of injury – later labelled illness/injury sensitivity
IIS; Taylor, 1993) – as fundamental2 elements underlying all fears
nd therein neuroticism.
AS, the propensity to catastrophically appraise the symptoms
r sensations related to anxiety (e.g., palpitations, trembling),
escribes fearing potential consequences associated with anxiety
ensations (Taylor, 1999), and several symptom proﬁle mod-
ls incorporate AS as critical (Olatunji, Broman-Fulks, Bergman,
reen, & Zlomke, 2010). FNE describes fearing negative evalua-
ions (Heimberg, Brozovich, & Rapee, 2010; Leary, 1983) and is
 hallmark of social anxiety (Heimberg et al., 2010). IIS describes
earing physical harm and the associated consequences (Carleton,
smundson, & Taylor, 2005; Reiss, Peterson, Gursky, & McNally,
986; Taylor, 1993). IIS relates to speciﬁc phobias (e.g., spiders;
age, 1994), pain-related anxiety (Vancleef, Peters, Roelofs, &
smundson, 2006), chronic pain (Thibodeau, Fetzner, Carleton,
achur, & Asmundson, 2013; Verbunt et al., 2003), and disability
Carleton, Abrams, Kachur, & Asmundson, 2009, Carleton, Abrams,
achur, & Asmundson, 2010).Reiss’ (1991) approach to identifying fundamental fears was
ummarized by Taylor (1993): “Reiss (1991), and personal com-
unication, June 1991) used two criteria to deﬁne these fears as
undamental; (1) they are fears of inherently noxious [aversive]
2 Paralleling Spielberger’s (1972) use of the term fundamental. Disorders 41 (2016) 5–21 7
stimuli, and (2) other, ‘common’ fears can be logically reduced to
them” (p. 289). Taylor implied fundamental fears cannot require
a priori learning (i.e., an unconditioned stimulus and an uncon-
ditioned response), should underlie more “common” fears and
anxieties, and should not be rationally related to other fears (Taylor,
1993). Neither inherent3 nor noxious4 were deﬁned by Reiss (1991)
or Taylor (1993), implying the dictionary deﬁnitions, and Reiss
(1991) argued AS, FNE, and IIS were inherent. Accordingly, neuroti-
cism would result from learned fears facilitated by inherent AS, FNE,
and IIS. The supposition accords with notions that “neuroticism is
not an explanatory concept in the aetiology of psychopathology,
since it measures a person’s characteristic level of distress over
a protracted period of time” (Ormel et al., 2004; p. 906), as well
as Clark and Beck’s (2010) notions that “fear, then, is the basic
cognitive process underlying all anxiety disorders” (p. 29).
Each of AS, FNE, and IIS appears at least partially distinct
from each other (e.g., Carleton, Thibodeau, Osborne, Taylor, &
Asmundson, 2014; Taylor, 1993) and neuroticism (e.g., Cornwell,
Johnson, Berardi, & Grillon, 2006; Muris, Vlaeyen, & Meesters, 2001;
Thibodeau, Carleton, Collimore, & Asmundson, 2012; Vancleef et al.,
2006); however, the intercorrelations range from 0.24 to 0.76, indi-
cating important shared variance (e.g., Carleton, Thibodeau et al.,
2014; Thibodeau et al., 2012). Each has also demonstrated theo-
retical and predictive utility beyond neuroticism for common fears
(Heimberg et al., 2010; Olatunji et al., 2010; Thibodeau, Fetzner
et al., 2013). More importantly, reductions in one (e.g., AS), can
reduce common fears (Boswell, Thompson-Hollands, Farchione,
& Barlow, 2013), even when related more to another fundamen-
tal fear. For example, interoceptive exposure reduces AS, but also
social anxiety (Collimore & Asmundson, 2014; Dixon, Kemp, Farrell,
Blakey, & Deacon, 2015), which appears more related to FNE
(Heimberg et al., 2010).
4. Revisiting the criteria for fundamental fears
The criteria introduced by Reiss (1991) and Taylor (1993) pro-
vide a solid foundation for identifying fundamental fears that can
be expanded in at least two  ways. First, by integrating requirements
from contemporary emotion theories (Mulligan & Scherer, 2012).
Second, by integrating subsequent criteria proffered for identify-
ing fundamental fears or elements in psychological constructs as
identiﬁed from a brief literature review.
The review was  not intended to be exhaustive and comprehen-
sive. Instead, English articles in Thomson Reuters’ Web  of Science
Core Collection database that referenced Taylor (1993), 55 in total,
were reviewed for critiques or revisions to the criteria; however,
none were identiﬁed. The same database was searched for English
psychology or psychiatry articles titled with the phrase innate
fear or non-associated fear, which have also been used to describe
fundamental fears. The result was  35 articles, one of which ref-
erenced Poulton and Menzies (2002a,b) criteria for such fears.
Poulton and Menzies’ article had been cited 20 times, none of
which proffered revisions to their criteria. The same database was
searched for the term “fundamental” as a title in English psy-
chology or psychiatry review articles published since 1993. There
were 30 results. Among those, one article provided a set of criteria
for identifying fundamental elements of a psychological construct1995). There were two additional articles that offered principles for
3 “existing in someone or something as a permanent and inseparable element,
quality, or attribute”; “intrinsic” (“inherent,” n.d.); i.e.,  require little or no learning.
4 “harmful or injurious to health or physical well-being”; “unpleasant”(“noxious,”
n.d.); i.e., aversive.
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Table 1
Example supporting evidence for fundamental fear criteria.
Preliminary Strong Stronger Very Strong
2 Broad theoretical
congruence across
psychological disciplines
Developmentally early
reports of fear following
stimulus exposure
Species with similar
neurobiological substrates
experience fear following
stimulus exposure
Genotypic heritability and
stimulus-speciﬁc biological
substrates
3  Logical thought
experiments
Cross-sectional heritability
and developmental
research
Longitudinal heritability
and developmental
research
Experimental research
with human and
non-human animals
encountering the
candidate fear
4  Descriptive statistics
indicating normative
distributions
Taxometric analyses
indicating a continuous
latent structure
Discriminant
epidemiological research
for pathologies
Experimental heritability
research across species
5  Logical thought
experiments
Qualitative research with
samples reporting diverse
fear intensities
Cross-sectional research
assessing for changes in
higher-order variables
based on lower-order
variables
Prospective research
manipulating the fear and
assessing subsequent
changes in higher-order
variables
6  Logical thought
experiments
Qualitative and quantitative research using downward
arrow techniques with samples having diverse fears
and fear intensities
Prospective research
manipulating higher-order
fear(s), but not the
fundamental fear, and
evidencing absent change
in the fundamental fear
7  Logical thought
experiments
Cross-sectional correlation
and regression analyses
Prospective longitudinal research assessing variance
accounted for by experimental manipulations to the
fundamental fear
8  Factor analytic evidence
that indicates robust
independence from other
Manipulating a fear and ﬁnding evidence that a
similarly lower-ordered fear was  minimally impacted
Lesioning studies
demonstrating dedicated
biological substrates for a
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dentifying traits (McAdams & Pals, 2006) or fundamental causal
gents (Gottfredson, 2004); however, all were congruent with
nderson et al. (2015) criteria, which were derived from an exten-
ive review of what constitutes fundamentality for motivation;
herefore, Baumeister and Leary’s (1995) criteria per Anderson et al.
2015), as well as criteria from Poulton and Menzies (2002a) were
ntegrated with Reiss (1991) and Taylor’s (1993) criteria. Accord-
ngly, increasingly fundamental (i.e., lower-order) fears should be
s follows, with examples of supporting evidence in Table 1.
.1. Criterion One
Fundamental fears should be emotions. Following Mulligan and
cherer’s (2012) deﬁnition, a fundamental fear is (1) time limited,
2) triggered by at least one appraisal, (3) guided by at least one
ppraisal, (4) contains bodily changes (e.g., arousal) that are felt,
nd (5) involves a perceptual or intellectual episode. A percept in
nd of itself is not an emotion; therefore, sensations (e.g., noci-
eption) and reﬂexes (e.g., startle) are not emotions (Leventhal &
cherer, 1987; Moors, 2009); however, a stimulus (perceived pre-
onsciously or consciously), sensation, or reﬂex that results in an
nherent appraisal that triggers an emotion of fear (Mulligan &
cherer, 2012) would meet Criterion One. Emotions are experi-
nced on continua of intensities (e.g., Fox, 2008; Lang, 1995; Lang,
radley, & Cuthbert, 1998a, Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1998b; Lang,
radley, Fitzsimmons et al., 1998; Scherer, 2005); as such, per
arleton (2016), fear will refer to a continuum ranging from low
e.g., dislike, bother) to moderate (e.g., fearful) to high (e.g., terror).
.2. Criterion TwoFundamental fears should be responses to stimuli inherently
ppraised as aversive. The stimulus should (nearly) automati-
ally activate the Behavioural Inhibition System (BIS; Gray &single, discrete,
fundamental fear
McNaughton, 2003; Gray, 1976) or analogue thereof because the
stimulus is inherently appraised as aversive; herein, inherent
describes responses requiring little or no a priori learning (i.e.,  con-
ditioning or observation) and aversive describes “an actually or
potentially tissue-damaging event” (Loeser & Treede, 2008; p. 475).
4.3. Criterion Three
Fundamental fears should be evolutionarily supported such
that the fear produced by the stimulus would have a logically-
defensible selection bias. An evolutionary selection bias dovetails
with Criterion Two. Normative phenotypic levels should provide
logically supported evolutionary individual and group level advan-
tages, with extreme phenotypic levels advantaging the group. For
example, normative IIS would be evolutionarily supported at the
individual level. Extremely high IIS for a group subset might mit-
igate group risk; in contrast, extremely low IIS for a group subset
might facilitate protection from predators.
4.4. Criterion four
Fundamental fears should be continuously and normally dis-
tributed in the population. An inherent fear would be biologically
supported with an underlying genetic basis (i.e., Criteria Two
and Three). The fear should be present at some level in most
healthy individuals, with pathology and/or group-speciﬁc advan-
tages rather than individual advantages occurring at extremes (i.e.,
the tails of the distribution).
4.5. Criterion FiveA fundamental fear should be a logical reduction of higher-order
constructs (e.g., “common” fear- and anxiety-related constructs;
personality constructs, such as trait anxiety, neuroticism, neurotic
nxiety
t
F
i
f
t
(
u
e
r
p
4
i
o
r
p
b
r
r
F
n
n
a
Y
a
p
4
h
i
c
e
F
m
m
c
n
a
o
p
e
m
a
F
s
H
2
4
C
r
5
c
c
f
l
mR.N. Carleton / Journal of A
emperament, negative affectivity; disorder-related symptoms).
or example, high neuroticism > fearing unemployment > fears of
nsufﬁcient resources > fears of starvation > fears of physical harm;
earing unemployment (relatively higher-order) would contribute
o heightened neuroticism, but be driven by fear of physical harm
relatively lower-order fear; increasingly fundamental). Fearing
nemployment logically requires substantial a priori learning, the
lements of which can then be logically reduced to include a
elationship between employment, access to food, and avoiding
hysical harm.
.6. Criterion Six
Fundamental fears should be non-derivative (i.e., logically
rreducible). As fears become increasingly fundamental (i.e., lower-
rder; non-derivative), fewer a priori determinants should be
equired. For example, “What is fear-inducing about being unem-
loyed?” might be followed by, “What is fear-inducing about not
eing paid?” At some point the iterative downward arrow logical
eduction process should produce a logical tautologically expressed
hetorically as, “I fear it because I fear it”. Criteria Two, Three,
ive, and Six are related because higher-order constructs would
ecessarily be learned derivations of lower-order fears, whereas a
on-derivative fear should be inherent and tautological. Fears that
re part of an irreducible cyclical tautology (e.g., I fear X because of
, and I fear Y because of X, but neither X nor Y are feared because of
n irreducible Z) could also be argued as non-derivative and therein
otentially fundamental.
.7. Criterion Seven
Fundamental fears should be able to account for variance in
igher-order constructs; as such, fundamental fears should be
ncreasingly correlated with increasingly proximal higher-order
onstructs (i.e., requiring fewer downward arrow iterations). For
xample, if public performance fears can be readily reduced to
NE, the constructs should be highly correlated. Other variables
ight still be important (e.g., fear of being injured by an angry
ob), but would have lower correlations. The fear should also be
orrelated with increasingly distal higher-order constructs (e.g.,
euroticism); however, the relationship should become smaller
s contributions from other lower-order elements are included
r accounted for. Changes to lower-order constructs should also
roduce diffuse changes in related higher-order constructs. For
xample, rather than targeting public speaking, giving a perfor-
ance, or blushing, therapists could target FNE, broadly reducing
ll related higher-order fears (Barlow, Ellard et al., 2011; Barlow,
archione et al., 2011); that said, FNE might be targeted using expo-
ures involving those higher-order fears (Heimberg & Becker, 2002;
eimberg, Becker, Goldﬁnger, & Vermilyea, 1985; Heimberg et al.,
010; Hofmann, 2007).
.8. Criterion Eight
A fundamental fear should be factorially distinct. Paralleling
riterion Seven, Criterion Eight provides more than logical or
hetorical evidence of Criteria Five and Six.
. Reassessing the original fundamental fears
AS, FNE, and IIS appear important, inﬂuential, and lower-order
onstructs that contribute to higher-order constructs (e.g., neuroti-
ism; psychopathological symptoms); however, whether they are
undamental remains debatable. Since Reiss’ (1991) publication at
east three additional fears have been posited as potentially funda-
ental: fear of death (Iverach, Menzies, & Menzies, 2014), fear of Disorders 41 (2016) 5–21 9
pain (Carleton, Abrams, Asmundson, Antony, & McCabe, 2009), and
FOTU (Carleton, 2012, 2016). What follows is neither an exhaustive
discussion of each fear, nor intended to discount the importance of
any fear. Instead, the discourse is intended to provocatively argue
the relative fundamentality of FOTU.
There appears to be initial evidence that AS, FNE, and IIS meet
criteria One, Four, Five, Seven, and Eight. Each appears to be an emo-
tion. Moreover, moderately intense AS, FNE, and IIS, would facilitate
self-care, mitigate inappropriate risk-taking, and support the devel-
opment of social networks (Buss, 1990); however, too much would
be paralyzing and too little would be self-destructive. Having
a group subset with higher than average fears might facilitate
appropriate group-level safety behaviours (e.g., avoiding danger-
ous locations) and group cohesion (e.g., encouraging pro-social
behaviours). In contrast, having a group subset with lower than
average fears might facilitate protection from predators (e.g., mem-
bers willing and able to risk individual harm to protect the group).
Each appears to be a logical reduction of higher-order constructs.
AS appears to be a logical reduction of anxiety and, therein, most
if not all anxiety disorders (Taylor, 1999). AS accounts for variance
in higher-order constructs (Naragon-Gainey, 2010; Olatunji et al.,
2010; Smits, Berry, Tart, & Powers, 2008; Taylor, 1999), including
neuroticism (Calkins et al., 2009; Olatunji & Wolitzky-Taylor, 2009;
Schmidt et al., 2010; Schmidt & Mallott, 2006; Taylor, 1999), and
has dimensions that appear continuously distributed in the popu-
lation (Asmundson, Weeks, Carleton, Thibodeau, & Fetzner, 2011;
Bernstein, Zvolensky, Norton et al., 2007; Bernstein, Zvolensky,
Stewart, & Comeau, 2007). FNE is the hallmark logical reduction
of social anxiety and accounts for variance in the higher-order con-
struct (e.g., Heimberg et al., 2010); furthermore, the latent structure
of FNE and social anxiety appears continuous (Weeks, Carleton,
Asmundson, McCabe, & Antony, 2010; Weeks, Norton, & Heimberg,
2009). IIS appears to be a logical reduction of harm-related phobias
(e.g., health anxiety) and accounts for variance in related higher-
order constructs (Asmundson, Abramowitz, Richter, & Whedon,
2010; Thibodeau, Fetzner et al., 2013); the latent structure of IIS
remains to be assessed. Each appears at least partially factorially
distinct (Carleton, Thibodeau et al., 2014; Taylor, 1993).
Despite Reiss’ (1991) original contention, AS, FNE, and IIS do not
appear to meet Criterion Two or Criterion Six. None appear to be
fearful emotional responses to stimuli that are necessarily inher-
ently appraised as aversive. Individuals may  yet be predisposed to
or prepared for such fears, but each appears to require a priori learn-
ing. In addition, none appear to be necessarily non-derivative (i.e.,
logically irreducible) because they can be logically reduced to one
or more other component fears, or appear to be dependent on a
moderator (e.g., another fear).
5.1. Not necessarily inherent
AS appears to require a priori learning about potential con-
sequences for the sensations (Taylor, 1993, 1999). For example,
elevated heart rate, palpitations, and shortness of breath are not
inherently aversive; instead, some people actively seek such sen-
sations by engaging in higher-risk behaviours for entertainment
(e.g., movies, sky diving; Allison et al., 2012; Rooney, Benson,
& Hennessy, 2012) or due to problematic behaviours (e.g., sub-
stance use, gambling; Comeau, Stewart, & Loba, 2001; Hittner &
Swickert, 2006; Schmidt, Mussel, & Hewig, 2013). The sensations
do not become aversive, facilitating AS, without (1) an anticipated
consequential threat that would have required learning (i.e.,  not
inherent); (2) fear of some potential consequential threat (e.g.,
heart palpitations may  precede a heart attack; Carleton, 2012;
Carleton, Norton, & Asmundson, 2007; Fergus & Bardeen, 2013;
Taylor, 1999); or (3) fear because of insufﬁcient certainty of safety
(Carleton, 2012, 2016). The stimuli would not be appraised as
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Ellsworth, Scherer, & Frijda, 2013). Reﬂexes could be appraised per-
cepts causally associated with fear pending appropriate learning
(Mulligan & Scherer, 2012); however, reﬂexes would not evidence0 R.N. Carleton / Journal of A
hreatening without a priori learning that such stimuli can precede
versive consequences, FOTU acting as a moderator, or FOTU acti-
ating the BIS (Carleton, 2016). An evolutionary argument for AS
reparedness could be made (e.g., mitigating injury and illness);
owever, effective interventions (e.g., pharmaceuticals to mitigate
eart attacks) supporting the beneﬁts for early reactions to such
ensations (e.g., racing heart) are relatively recent.
FNE may  also require a priori learning. For example, the complex
ules associated with even relatively simple and common social
nteractions are not universal (e.g., eye contact; Akechi et al., 2013).
ules for conversations and overt behaviours are even more com-
lex. Learning the social rules alone is not sufﬁcient to produce
NE. The consequences for violating those social rules (i.e., garner-
ng negative evaluation) must also be learned, directly or indirectly;
owever, FNE could be moderated by FOTU. That said, an evolution-
ry argument for FNE preparedness may  be particularly defensible.
ooperative group membership would offer a substantial evolu-
ionary advantages (e.g., Ackerman, Huang, & Bargh, 2012) and FNE
ay  have reduced the risk of critical group membership breaches
Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Haselton & Nettle, 2006).
IIS also appears to require a priori learning. For example, a person
ould be born having not experienced (i.e., exposure), witnessed
i.e., vicarious exposure), or understood (i.e., didactic exposure; e.g.,
aught about Type I diabetes) injury or illness. Until such learn-
ng occurred there would be no way to know that injury or illness
xisted, much less that they can be aversive and should be feared;
owever, IIS could be moderated by FOTU. Again, an evolutionary
rgument for IIS preparedness could be made (e.g., reducing the
robability of death before sexual maturity); however, such general
ears become conﬂated with mechanisms (e.g., predators), intensi-
ies (e.g., a laceration vs. a bruise; a common cold vs. tuberculosis),
r nociception. Fearing illness as inherent on the basis of an evo-
utionary argument would be particularly challenging. Our ability
o identify illness with our primary senses (e.g., visual assessment)
s relatively poor except for advanced stages of some illnesses (e.g.,
mall pox) and our understanding of illness as typically induced by
ther agents (e.g., bacteria, virus, genetics) is very recent.
Despite their importance, the evidence does not appear to
upport AS, FNE, or IIS as being deﬁnitively inherent. All three
ppear to require another fear or substantial learning contingent
n expectations of aversive consequences–speciﬁc, non-speciﬁc, or
nknown–which then become the focus of fear, rather than the AS
ensations, the negative evaluation, the actual illness or injury.
.2. Arguably derivative (i.e., not necessarily logically irreducible)
AS subsumes fearful responses to somatic, cognitive, and social
ategories of interoceptive stimuli “based on the belief that the
ensations have adverse consequences such as death, insanity, or
ocial rejection (Reiss & McNally, 1985)” (Taylor et al., 2007; p.
77). Example descriptions can be drawn from the Anxiety Sen-
itivity Index 3 (Taylor et al., 2007): “When I feel pain in my  chest,
 worry that I’m going to have a heart attack” (Somatic); “When my
houghts seem to speed up, I worry that I might be going crazy”
Cognitive); “When I begin to sweat in a social situation, I fear peo-
le will think negatively of me  (Social)”. The description of AS and
he exemplar items appears to suggest the fear is logically reducible
o at least one other fear (e.g., heart attack; psychopathology;
egative evaluation). Furthermore, insufﬁcient certainty regard-
ng the pending consequences appears critical (Carleton, Sharpe,
 Asmundson, 2007).
FNE refers to “apprehension about others’ evaluations, distressver their negative evaluations, avoidance of evaluative situations,
nd the expectation that others would evaluate oneself negatively”
Watson & Friend, 1969; p. 449). Example descriptions can be
rawn from the Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (Rodebaugh Disorders 41 (2016) 5–21
et al., 2004; Weeks et al., 2005): “I am frequently afraid of other peo-
ple noticing my  shortcomings”; “I am afraid that other people will
ﬁnd fault with me”. Negative evaluation could well lead to physi-
cal harm in modern or historical societies (Ackerman et al., 2012)
through being physically attacked or ostracized. Social dimensions
of AS (e.g., fearing blushing or sweating), are related to social
anxiety (Carleton, Collimore, & Asmundson, 2010; Rector, Szacun-
Shimizu, & Leybman, 2007; Taylor et al., 2007), possibly because
they can compromise status (Seyfarth & Cheney, 2012). A related
construct, fear of positive evaluation (FPE; Weeks, Heimberg,
Rodebaugh, & Norton, 2008), also appears important and distinct
(Weeks, Jakatdar, & Heimberg, 2010; Whiting et al., 2014). Exam-
ple descriptions can be drawn from the Fear of Positive Evaluation
Scale (Weeks, Heimberg, & Rodebaugh, 2008): “I am uncomfort-
able exhibiting my  talents to others, even when I think my talents
will impress them”. FPE has not been posited as fundamental, but
therein appears to have strengths and limitations similar to FNE.
IIS subsumes fearful responses to becoming ill or injured
(Carleton et al., 2005). Example descriptions can be drawn from
the Illness/Injury Sensitivity Index-Revised (Carleton, Park, &
Asmundson, 2006): “I am frightened of being injured” (Injury);
“The thought of physical illness scares me”  (Illness). The breadth
may  be problematic because objective indications of tissue damage
(e.g., unexplained bruises) may  be dismissed as non-threatening;
similarly, evidence of infection (e.g., a virus screen) may  be asso-
ciated with no threatening symptoms. Conversely, persons can
report experiencing substantial symptoms indicating tissue dam-
age or infection, with no objective indications of either (Asmundson
& Carleton, 2008). There would also be considerable difﬁculty in
disentangling IIS from fears of the causal mechanism (e.g., preda-
tion) and aversive sensations (e.g., dizziness, pain). Accordingly, IIS
may be logically reducible to AS, fear of pain (Carleton, Abrams,
Asmundson et al., 2009), FNE (Carleton & Asmundson, 2012), or
FOTU (Carleton, 2012, 2016).
Each of AS, FNE, and IIS appears well-supported as lower-order
relative to common fears, higher-order factors, and psychopatholo-
gies; however, sensations (e.g., chest pain), negative evaluations
(e.g., by a competitor with insufﬁcient agency for retribution), or
injuries and illnesses (e.g., a trivial scratch) sufﬁciently known to
be inconsequential are unlikely to be feared; instead, sufﬁcient
certainty of safety can make anxiety-related sensations appeti-
tive, rather than aversive, negative evaluations empowering, and
soreness from minor post-workout injuries invigorating. By con-
trast, pending sufﬁcient certainty of aversive consequences, the fear
could refer to a consequence and only tangentially to AS, FNE, or
IIS (Carleton, 2012; Carleton, Sharpe et al., 2007). In the absence
of sufﬁcient certainty, responses appear to depend signiﬁcantly on
individual responses to unknowns (Carleton, 2012, 2016). In any
case, AS, FNE, and IIS, appear reﬂexively related and reducible to
fears of death, pain, or unknowns; therefore, despite being lower-
order and critical, none appear deﬁnitively fundamental.
5.3. Fear of death as fundamental
Benjamin Franklin is often referenced as saying nothing can be
said to be certain, except death and taxes. Death is the conclu-
sion of the process that is dying. Fearing death is not evidenced by
reﬂexes to preserve life (e.g., breathing, Moro5), because reﬂexes
are not emotions (Leventhal & Scherer, 1987; Moors, 2009; Moors,5 An infant reﬂex of adduction and then ﬂexion of the arms, triggered by a per-
ception of falling (Zafeiriou, 2004).
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ear of death as inherent any more than salivation evidences fear
f starvation as inherent. For example, Moro following a sudden
rop could cause fear of vestibular motor sensations associated
ith falling or fear of pain after impact; conversely, it could cause
oy if caught repeatedly being caught by a parent was perceived as
ertain.
A person who fears death may  not fear death, per se, instead fear-
ng (1) the process of dying, which is reducible to other fears (e.g.,
S, FNE, IIS, fear of pain); (2) that death will be unpleasant (e.g., the
fterlife may  be painful); (3) unknowns about death (e.g., death may
r may  not involve an afterlife), making the unknown the object of
ear; or (4) the concept of oblivion, an unequivocal unknown, which
equires substantial a priori learning. Neither dying nor death are
nherent concepts; both must be learned (Balk, 2010). “Absence
f fear of death among children under ten [years of age] is in
eeping with Anthony’s study reported in The Child’s Discovery of
eath (Anthony, 1940)” (Bowlby, 1973, p.117). As detailed in Car-
eton’s review (Carleton, 2016), children fear unknowns, darkness,
nd snakes–among other things–long before demonstrating under-
tanding or fear of death (Bowlby, 1973; Kagan & Snidman, 2004).
urthermore, death is not necessarily aversive or avoided. Many
eligions posit death as involving a fantastic and appetitive after-
ife (Segal, 2010). Where the afterlife is potentially appetitive, any
ssociated fear must result from (1) insufﬁcient certainty in the
romise of that appetitive afterlife or (2) the process of dying as a
ransition to that afterlife. Notional development of an appetitive
fterlife may  have been to cope with unknowns related to death.
For this fear of death is indeed the pretence of wisdom, and not real
isdom, being the appearance of knowing the unknown; since no
ne knows whether death, which they in their fear apprehend to be
he greatest evil, may  not be the greatest good” (Socrates, 399 BC).
n any case, fear of death, while arguably pervasive and poignant,
oes not appear fundamental.
.4. Fear of pain as fundamental
Haruki Murakami claimed “Pain is inevitable. Suffering is
ptional” (Murakami, 2009; p.vii); relatedly, fear of pain may  be
undamental (Carleton, 2012; Carleton, Abrams, Asmundson et al.,
009). Pain is a sensory and emotional experience associated with
erceived or potential tissue damage (Loeser & Treede, 2008; p.
75). Nociception is the neuronal processing of noxious stimuli,
eginning with the activation of nociceptors (Loeser & Treede,
008; p. 475). Nociception is inherently aversive (Pear, 2014; Rolls,
013), but evolutionarily derivative for mitigating injury and death
Broom, 2001; Fields, 2006) and not necessarily fear provoking
Asmundson & Carleton, 2008; Carleton & Asmundson, 2012). Noci-
eption is neither an emotion (Leventhal & Scherer, 1987; Moors,
009) nor synonymous with the subjective and complex experi-
nce of pain, which involves nociception, appraisals, attributions
f meaning (Asmundson, Norton, & Norton, 1999; International
ssociation for the Study of Pain, 1986; Loeser & Treede, 2008;
elzack & Katz, 2004). The distinction complicates assessing fear
f pain as fundamental because fear of pain typically refers to the
xperience of pain rather than nociception (Asmundson & Carleton,
008; Carleton & Asmundson, 2012).
Nociception evokes appraisals that may produce the experience
f pain (Asmundson & Wright, 2004) and is not required to experi-
nce pain (e.g., phantom limb pain; Diers, Christmann, Koeppe, Ruf,
 Flor, 2010; Melzack, 1990). Fear of pain references the unpleasant
ensory and emotional experience that may  be associated with the
ociception, but is the result of substantial and complex learning
ased on attributions of meaning to nociception (Asmundson et al.,
999; International Association for the Study of Pain, 1986; Melzack
 Katz, 2004), making it neither inherent nor non-derivative.
ociception might be aversive but not fear-provoking if the fol- Disorders 41 (2016) 5–21 11
lowing are certain: (1) short length; (2) manageable intensity; (3)
no consequential sequelae (e.g. not harmful); or (4) consequen-
tial sequelae are appetitive (e.g., goal completion; pleasure). For
example, consuming spicy foods, long-distance running, or elective
skin puncturing may  be sought because the nociception is consid-
ered certainly short and consequentially pleasurable. In contrast,
uncertainty regarding the duration, intensity, and injuriousness
associated with nociception could dramatically increase fear and
anxiety. Increased FOTU appears to increase fear of pain in response
to nociception (Helsen, Goubert, & Vlaeyen, 2013), therein sup-
porting FOTU as a critical moderator or determinant for fear and
anxiety-related nociception.
Despite the aforementioned challenges to fear of pain as
fundamental, it appears normally and continuously distributed
(Asmundson & Carleton, 2008; Asmundson, Vlaeyen, & Crombez,
2004). Fear of pain is also a logical reduction of pain-related anx-
iety (Carleton & Asmundson, 2009; Powell, Honey, & Symbaluk,
2012), which accounts for variance in higher-order constructs (e.g.,
chronic pain; Carleton & Asmundson, 2012) and appears ubiqui-
tous (Carleton, Abrams, Asmundson et al., 2009). Pain-related fear
and anxiety are related, but factorially distinct from each other
(Carleton & Asmundson, 2009), and from AS, IIS, and FNE (Carleton,
Abrams, Asmundson et al., 2009; Carleton, Thibodeau et al., 2014);
however, meta-analytic results support a robust relationship with
AS such that pain-related fear and anxiety may  be derivatives of,
or reﬂexively related to, AS (Ocanez, McHugh, & Otto, 2010). In any
case, fear of pain appears well-supported as a lower-order construct
that meets some criteria for being fundamental; however, fear of
pain requires learned appraisals and attributions, and appears log-
ically reducible, or reﬂexively related, to AS, IIS, FNE, death, and
FOTU. As such, fear of pain, while critically important, may  not be
fundamental.
6. Fear of the unknown
6.1. Inherent
Perhaps the earliest direct written reference to FOTU as the
fundamental fear came from Lovecraft in 1927: “The oldest and
strongest emotion of mankind is fear, and the oldest and strongest
kind of fear is fear of the unknown” (as cited in Joshi & Schultz,
2001; p. 255). The quote remains relevant, with colloquialisms ref-
erencing not knowing as the worst part of distressing situations.
FOTU tautologically does not require a priori learning; indeed, the
ﬁrst thing that could be feared would be “the perceived absence of
information at any level of consciousness” (Carleton, 2016; p. 31).
All other fears appear to require learning involving the perceived
presence of perceived or recalled information (Bandura, 1965, 1971;
Mowrer, 1947; Muris et al., 2002; Pinker, 1997; Powell et al., 2012;
Skinner, 1953).
Broad theoretical congruence across psychological disciplines
suggests unknowns are inherently appraised as aversive (e.g., emo-
tion, development, attachment, neurobiology; see for review and
synthesis, Carleton, 2016). Contemporary emotion theories place
checks for unknowns at the earliest stage of emotion processing
(i.e., low-level neural substrates), underscore pervasive inﬂuences
thereafter (e.g., conceptual cortical areas; Mulligan & Scherer,
2012; Scherer, 2009, 2013), and implicate aggregate responses
to unknowns as deﬁning affective dispositions (Scherer & Brosch,
2009). Models of attachment and temperament explicitly discuss
FOTU as inherent and intrinsic to the development of neuroticism
(e.g., Ainsworth & Bell, 1970; Bowlby, 1973; Colonnesi et al., 2011;
Degnan & Fox, 2007; Kagan & Snidman, 2004; Lewis-Morrarty et al.,
2016, in press; Madigan, Atkinson, Laurin, & Benoit, 2013; Moehler
et al., 2008). Finally, the Uncertainty and Anticipation Model of Anx-
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ety (UAMA; Grupe & Nitschke, 2013) posits negative interactions
ith uncertainty as facilitating maladaptive responses including
inﬂated estimates of threat cost improbability, hypervigilance,
ivision safety learning, behavioural and cognitive avoidance and
eightened reactivity to threat uncertainty” (Grupe & Nitschke,
013; p. 490).
Neurobiological researchers have emphasized FOTU as a cor-
erstone for BIS activation and therein fear and anxiety (Bach &
olan, 2012; Gray & McNaughton, 2003; Grupe & Nitschke, 2013;
erry et al., 2007; Jackson, Nelson, & Proudﬁt, 2015; Kagan &
nidman, 2004; Nelson, Kessel, Jackson, & Hajcak, 2016; Thayer,
hs, Fredrikson, Sollers, & Wager, 2012). A recent meta-analysis
videnced unknowns as increasing heart rate variability and acti-
ation of the amygdala and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (Thayer
t al., 2012). There is also “distinct neural encoding (including sum-
ary statistic-type representations) of uncertainty [that] occurs in
istinct neural systems” (Bach & Dolan, 2012, p. 572). Furthermore,
he earliest cognitive processing of stimuli automatically classiﬁes
 stimulus as threatening or not based on knowns and unknowns
Bradley, Mogg, Millar, & White, 1995; Cisler & Koster, 2010;
athews & MacLeod, 1994, 2005; McNally, 1995), with unknown
timuli consistently categorized as threatening. Unknowns incre-
entally activate the BIS (Gray & McNaughton, 2003), increase
rror-related negativity based on event-related potentials (Jackson,
elson, & Hajcak, 2016; Jackson et al., 2015), potentiate star-
le (Nelson & Shankman, 2011), and produce sustained amygdala
nd hippocampal increases (Herry et al., 2007; Jackson et al.,
015).
.2. Evolutionarily supported
FOTU logically ﬁts within evolutionary psychology models
e.g., Buss, 1995). Indeed, there appears to be substantial theo-
etical and neurobiological evidence supporting the evolutionary
asis of FOTU (Brosschot, Verkuil, & Thayer, 2016). Enough fear
o approach unknowns with caution (i.e.,  treating unknowns as
otential threats) would be adaptive, so long as the intensity
id not compromise survival activities (e.g., seeking food, shel-
er, mates; Carleton, 2012). Accordingly, evolution should have
roduced a selection bias for assessing unknowns as likely threat-
ning and therein BIS activating (Bach & Dolan, 2012; Brosschot
t al., 2016; Cosmides & Tooby, 1996; Cosmides, 1989; Gigerenzer,
991; Thayer et al., 2012), but still potentially beneﬁcial (Gray &
cNaughton, 2003). That bias appears well reﬂected in neurobi-
logy, temperament, and development research (Brosschot et al.,
016; Carleton, 2016).
Given the evolutionary advantage associated with the assump-
tion of threat, the view that we and others have proposed is
that the “default” response to uncertainty, novelty, and threat
is the sympathoexcitatory preparation for action commonly
known as the ﬁght or ﬂight response (Herry et al., 2007; Thayer
& Lane, 2009). This default threat response may  be related to
the well-known ‘negativity bias,’ a phenomenon that describes
the tendency to prioritize negative information over positive
(Cacioppo, Gardner, & Berntson, 1999). From an evolutionary
perspective this represents a system that errs on the side of
caution—when in doubt prepare for the worst—thus maximiz-
ing survival and adaptive responses (LeDoux, 1996). (Thayer
et al., 2012, p. 749)
Humans and closely related non-human animals (e.g., bono-
os) prefer certainty to risk (Kacelnik & Bateson, 1996; Tversky Kahneman, 1981), but adapt based on learning history (e.g.,
he aggregate of encounters with unknowns) and situational vari-
bles (e.g., the relative number of knowns and unknowns; Gilby
 Wrangham, 2007; Heilbronner, Rosati, Stevens, Hare, & Hauser, Disorders 41 (2016) 5–21
2008; Stevens et al., 2005 Stevens, Rosati, Ross, & Hauser, 2005).
Non-human primate infants initially respond to unknowns with
fear and anxiety, but rapidly habituate in the absence of aversive
consequences (Kalin & Shelton, 1989; Kalin, Shelton, & Takahashi,
1991; Timmermans, Vochteloo, Vossen, Röder, & Duijghuisen,
1994). In non-primate mammals, “unknown objects evoking fear
are at ﬁrst avoided, increasing the immediate safety of the ani-
mal. However, if the level of fear is low or when it subsides with
time or gained distance, animals start active exploration of the
[unknown] object, territory, or context that evoked their anxiety or
fear and information gathered in the process of exploration allows
them to adapt to the novelty or environmental changes” (Pisula
et al., 2012; p. 145; Timmermans et al., 1994). Wild animals treat
unknowns as more aversive than animals raised in the relative
safety of laboratories (Tanas´ & Pisula, 2011). There is also substan-
tial evidence that responses to unknowns vary based on genetic
variation (Flagel, Waselus, Clinton, Watson, & Akil, 2014), with early
exposure to reliable environments impacting phenotype (Weaver
et al., 2004). For example, Tang and colleagues experimentally evi-
denced neonate rats as initially responding to unknowns with fear
(Akers et al., 2008; Tang, Akers, Reeb, Romeo, & McEwen, 2006;
Tang, Reeb-Sutherland, Romeo, & McEwen, 2012). The same stud-
ies demonstrated attenuation of the responses – for the duration
of their lifespan – through repeated brief exposures to unknowns
during early development. The attenuation was maximized when
the neonates had a mother with high levels of self-stress regula-
tion who, most importantly, provided reliable care. Poor self-stress
regulation in the mother or unreliable provision of care produced
neonates with higher FOTU; nevertheless, the exposures robustly
attenuated those responses.
6.3. Continuously and normally distributed
Undergraduate and community sample data suggests FOTU
is generally normally distributed with a slight positive skew
(e.g., Boelen & Reijntjes, 2009; Boelen, Vrinssen, & van Tulder,
2010; Carleton, Gosselin, & Asmundson, 2010; Carleton, Mulvogue
et al., 2012; Carleton, Norton et al., 2007; Whiting et al., 2014).
There is currently only one taxometric assessment involving FOTU
(Carleton, Weeks et al., 2012). The study used a large unselected
sample and three distinct taxometric procedures to assess latency.
The results evidenced FOTU, as measured by IU, appears contin-
uously distributed (Carleton, Weeks et al., 2012), but additional
research is needed; for example, assessments with data from clin-
ical samples.
6.4. Logical reduction of higher-Order constructs
The ﬁrst explicit suggestion that FOTU may  “be the most basic
component of pathological anxiety” and “a fundamental compo-
nent of all anxiety disorders” (Carleton, Sharpe et al., 2007; p.
2314) was published in 2007. Carleton’s (2012) summary proposi-
tion of the subsequent evidence was that FOTU, most prominently
demonstrated by IU, represents a “logically necessary . . . transdi-
agnostic dispositional risk factor for clinically signiﬁcant anxiety
and depression” (p. 943). Carleton (2016) reviewed and synthe-
sized literature spanning contemporary models of emotion and
neuroticism, including behavioural inhibition, neurobiology, and
temperament, focusing on the role of unknowns. The result was
evidence that responses to unknowns represent a pervasive logical
reduction of several higher-order constructs, including neuroti-
cism. Accordingly, there appears to be substantial support for the
notion that FOTU is a logical reduction of higher-order constructs.
In line with contemporary theories (Barlow, Ellard, Sauer-Zavala,
Bullis, & Carl, 2014; Carleton, 2016; Clark & Beck, 2010; Gray &
McNaughton, 2003), a person does not report having several fears
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ecause they have high levels of neuroticism (Carleton, 2016); a
erson currently reports high levels of neuroticism because they
re fearful of unknowns in a variety of contexts, as well as having
everal other fears.
.5. Non-Derivative (i.e., logically irreducible)
Each of AS, FNE, and IIS, as well as fears of death and pain, can
e logically reduced to another feared element (e.g., being anxious
bout illness for fear of being negatively evaluated), form reﬂex-
vely circular tautologies with each other, or are dependent on
OTU. In contrast, the current logical, rhetorical, and biological evi-
ence suggests FOTU is non-derivative. The unknown itself has
ong been considered potentially threatening (e.g, Dugas, Letarte,
héaume, Freeston, & Ladouceur, 1995; Epstein, 1972; Freeston,
héaume, Letarte, Dugas, & Ladouceur, 1994). Unknowns exacer-
ate fear (e.g., Dugas, Hedayati et al., 2005; Gray & McNaughton,
003; Grupe & Nitschke, 2013; Hock & Krohne, 2004) and that
ear moderates responses to ambiguous stimuli (e.g., Hedayati,
ugas, Buhr, & Francis, 2003, November). As FOTU increases, people
ecome more likely to accept negative consequences than toler-
te uncertainty (e.g., Buhr & Dugas, 2002; Ghosh, 1997; Rassin
 Muris, 2005). The appraisal models of emotion (Moors et al.,
013; Scherer, 2009), contemporary anxiety models (Barlow, Ellard
t al., 2014; Clark & Beck, 2010; Gray & McNaughton, 2003), and
he developmental literature (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall,
978; Bowlby, 1973, 1989; Kagan & Snidman, 2004) all place fearful
esponses to unknowns as the cornerstone of anxiety and non-
erivative (Carleton, 2016).
Consider a person who reports FOTU because it might lead to
n aversive outcome feared because of AS, FNE, IIS, fear of death, or
ear of pain. Irrespective of the feared aversive outcome, the logi-
al reduction process leads to asking what about that outcome is
roblematic. For example, I’m afraid of the unknown because I do
ot know if I will have a heart attack. If I have a heart attack I might
ie. If I die my  deity might judge me  negatively and punish me
ainfully. I’m afraid to experience such pain because I don’t know
ow long or intense it will be. I’m afraid because I don’t know. The
terative process of deriving fear-evoking elements appears to end,
autologically, with FOTU.
.6. Accounts for higher-order variance
Initial clinical research into FOTU, typically reﬂected by IU, has
ocused on worry and generalized anxiety disorder (GAD; Dugas
t al., 1995; Dugas, Marchand, & Ladouceur, 2005; Freeston et al.,
994; Ladouceur et al., 1999). Freeston et al. postulated a causal
elationship between IU and worry as constituents of GAD. Despite
nitial focus on worry and GAD, there is now overwhelming evi-
ence that FOTU, most commonly measured as IU, represents a
road transdiagnostic construct accounting for variance in several
igher-order constructs (see for review, Carleton, 2012, 2016; Hong
 Cheung, 2015).
Fearing the unknown, as most commonly reﬂected by IU, has
ccounted for statistically signiﬁcant variance in symptoms of panic
isorder (Buhr & Dugas, 2009; Carleton, Duranceau et al., 2014;
arleton, Fetzner, Hackl, & McEvoy, 2013), social anxiety disorder
Boelen & Reijntjes, 2009; Boelen et al., 2010; Carleton, Collimore
t al., 2010; Khawaja & McMahon, 2011; Teale Sapach, Carleton,
ulvogue, Weeks, & Heimberg, 2015; Whiting et al., 2014),
bsessive compulsive disorder (Grayson, 2010; Jacoby, Fabricant,
eonard, Riemann, & Abramowitz, 2013; Khawaja & McMahon,
011; Lind & Boschen, 2009; Tolin, Abramowitz, Brigidi, & Foa,
003), posttraumatic stress disorder (Banducci, Bujarski, Bonn-
iller, Patel, & Connolly, 2016; Boelen, 2010; Boelen, Reijntjes, &
mid, 2016; Fetzner, Horswill, Boelen, & Carleton, 2013; Oglesby, Disorders 41 (2016) 5–21 13
Boffa, Short, Raines, & Schmidt, 2016; Otis, Keane, & Kerns, 2003;
White & Gumley, 2009), substance use (Banducci et al., 2016),
health anxiety (Boelen & Carleton, 2012; Fergus & Bardeen, 2013;
Fergus & Valentiner, 2011; Fergus, 2013; Kurita, Garon, Stanton,
& Meyerowitz, 2013; Wright, 2016), separation anxiety (Boelen,
Reijntjes, & Carleton, 2014), and eating disorders (Konstantellou
& Reynolds, 2010; Renjan, McEvoy, Handley, & Fursland, 2016;
Sternheim, Startup, & Schmidt, 2011). FOTU has also been asso-
ciated with depression (Boelen et al., 2016; Meeten, Dash, Scarlet,
& Davey, 2012; Miranda, Fontes, & Marroquin, 2008; Miranda &
Mennin, 2007; Nelson, Shankman, & Proudﬁt, 2014; Yook, Kim, Suh,
& Lee, 2010), anger (Dugas, 2016; Fracalanza, Koerner, Deschenes,
& Dugas, 2014), and personality disorder symptoms (Berenbaum,
Bredemeier, & Thompson, 2008; Fergus & Rowatt, 2014).
There have been several broad studies, including meta-analyses,
supporting FOTU, reﬂected by IU, as a transdiagnostic factor that
appears generally comparable across psychopathologies (Boswell
et al., 2013; Carleton, Mulvogue et al., 2012; Freeston, 2016;
Freeston et al., 2016; Gentes & Ruscio, 2011; Mahoney & McEvoy,
2012c; McEvoy & Erceg-Hurn, 2016; McEvoy & Mahoney, 2013;
Norr et al., 2013). Furthermore, response patterns based on
multigroup conﬁrmatory factor analyses with questions assessing
FOTU appear invariant across sex (ps = 0.06 to 0.43), while being
signiﬁcantly different when comparing clinical samples to com-
munity (p < 0.01) and undergraduate (p < 0.01) samples (Carleton,
Mulvogue et al., 2012).
FOTU predicts variance in higher-order constructs in longitu-
dinal genetic twin research. For example, AS increases in children
and adults as a function of exposure to “stressful events (particu-
larly those that are uncontrollable and unpredictable i.e., unknown;
Carleton, 2016)” (Zavos, Gregory, & Eley, 2012, p. 205). There is
also evidence suggesting FOTU appears transdiagnostic in chil-
dren and adolescents (Freeston et al., 2016; Wright, 2016). FOTU
has also accounted for variance beyond AS (Boelen & Reijntjes,
2009; Carleton, Collimore et al., 2010; Carleton, Sharpe et al., 2007;
Dugas, Gosselin, & Landouceur, 2001), fear of anxiety (Buhr & Dugas,
2009), metabeliefs (de Bruin, Rassin, & Muris, 2007; Dugas et al.,
2007), disorder-speciﬁc IU (Thibodeau et al., 2015), positive and
negative affectivity (Carleton, Collimore et al., 2010; Thibodeau
et al., 2012), and neuroticism (Boelen & Reijntjes, 2009; Mahoney
& McEvoy, 2012b). That said, “neuroticism is not an explanatory
concept in the aetiology of psychopathology, since it measures a
person’s characteristic level of distress over a protracted period
of time” (Ormel et al., 2004; p. 906). Hierarchical linear regres-
sion entry order recommendations suggest the most fundamental
(i.e., lowest-order) construct or the temporally earliest construct
should be accounted for ﬁrst, with increasingly higher-order or
temporally distal constructs entered thereafter (Petrocelli, 2003).
As such, “controlling” for neuroticism or analogues thereof before
controlling for the lower-order determinants (e.g., fundamental
fears) of such higher-order constructs may  be suboptimal; nev-
ertheless, such assessments have stringently demonstrated that
FOTU, as most commonly reﬂected by IU, accounts for variance in
critical higher-order constructs.
Intentional and targeted reductions in FOTU, as reﬂected by
IU, have produced reductions in higher-order constructs. Per-
haps the earliest and most recognized treatment protocol for
reducing FOTU was  designed by Dugas and Ladouceur (Dugas &
Ladouceur, 2000; Ladouceur, Dugas et al., 2000). The treatment is
speciﬁc to IU and effective for reducing GAD symptoms (Dugas &
Ladouceur, 2000; Dugas & Robichaud, 2007; Ladouceur, Dugas et al.,
2000), but also produces changes within increasingly higher-order
constructs, such as worry or neuroticism (Buhr & Dugas, 2009;
Dugas, Laugesen, & Bukowski, 2012; Ladouceur, Dugas et al., 2000;
Ladouceur, Gosselin, & Dugas, 2000). As such, the evidence supports
GAD as “the phenotypic expression of high levels of neuroticism”
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Barlow, Ellard et al., 2014, p.488) and reducing FOTU may  be a
ynchpin for reducing neuroticism (Carleton, 2012, 2016).
Dugas and Ladouceur’s (2000) treatment protocol is the most
stablished and proliﬁc; however, there are alternatives. For
xample, a metacognitive therapy (van der Heiden, Muris, &
an der Molen, 2012) has substantially reduced IU and symp-
oms in patients with GAD (ds = 0.94 to 2.39). Further, Dugas
nd Ladouceur’s delineated treatment (Dugas & Robichaud, 2007)
ormed the basis for adaptations beyond GAD. Reductions in
U appear to reduce obsessive compulsive disorder symptoms
Grayson, 2010; Wilhelm & Steketee, 2006); more recently, Hewitt
nd colleagues (Hewitt, Egan, & Rees, 2009) used Dugas and
obichaud’s (2007) IU section to reduce social anxiety symptoms
n a case study (i.e., reliable change index scores > 1.96). Similarly,
ahoney and McEvoy (Mahoney & McEvoy, 2012a) provided a
-week cognitive behavioural group therapy (CBGT) for persons
ith social anxiety disorder. The therapy included “learning to tol-
rate uncertainty before, during, and after social situations was
mphasized during treatment and integrated into core skills” (p.
51). Reductions in IU (r2 = 0.57) predicted subsequent reductions
n depression (r2 = 0.37) and social anxiety symptoms (r2 = 0.61),
mplicating a causal relationship. Boswell et al. (2013) also sup-
orted Carleton’s (Carleton, 2012, 2016) proposition that FOTU
epresents a critical transdiagnostic factor with evidence from the
niﬁed Protocol for the Transdiagnostic Treatment of Emotional
isorders (Barlow, Ellard et al., 2011). The Uniﬁed Protocol includes
n exposure element focused on interactions with unknowns.
atients with various disorders received the treatment in a 16-
eek randomized control trial wherein symptoms fell (i.e., Hedges
 = 0.52 to 1.11; Farchione et al., 2012). Most recently, changes
n IU have been associated with reductions in repetitive negative
hinking (d = 1.25), depression (d = 1.09), social anxiety symptoms
d = 1.65 to 2.18), and GAD symptoms (d = 2.20; McEvoy & Erceg-
urn, 2016), further underscoring the transdiagnostic importance
f FOTU.
Hong and Cheung (Hong & Cheung, 2015) further evidenced
OTU as a common factor for treating anxiety and mood disor-
ers with a 73 article meta-analytic assessment of vulnerabilities
or depression and anxiety. The meta-analyses examined rela-
ionships between “six cognitive vulnerabilities associated with
epression (i.e., pessimistic inferential style, dysfunctional atti-
udes, and ruminative style) and anxiety (i.e., anxiety sensitivity,
U, and fear of negative evaluation)” (p.1). Their results supported
OTU as accounting for substantial variance in higher-order con-
tructs (rs = 0.45 to 0.57) and underscored the primacy of FOTU as
 vulnerability with the highest core factor loading of 0.81. “First,
U had the strongest factor loading—implying that a fundamental
ear of the unknown (Carleton, 2012) may  feature heavily in this
ommon core. This element of unknown may  encompass external
nvironmental uncertainties and threats and an individual’s inter-
ally oriented uncertainty about his or her own resources to deal
ith such threats” (Hong & Cheung, 2015; p.13).
FOTU, as commonly reﬂected by IU, also accounts for higher-
rder variance outside of other fears and anxiety. For example,
OTU accounts for substantial variance in explicit behavioural
asks (rs = 0.20 to 0.43; Jacoby, Abramowitz, Buck, & Fabricant,
014; Jacoby, Abramowitz, Reuman, & Blakey, 2016; Ladouceur,
albot, & Dugas, 1997), implicit behavioural tasks (part r = −0.78;
hibodeau, Carleton, Gomez-Perez, & Asmundson, 2013), and hap-
ics (d = −0.53; van Horen & Mussweiler, 2014), while interacting
ith behaviour and threat perception (partial 2 = 0.06; Reuman,
acoby, Fabricant, Herring, & Abramowitz, 2015). FOTU has also
een implicitly studied in the literature on decision making and risk
see, for example, Bammer & Smithson, 2008; Jaeger, Renn, Rosa, &
ebler, 2010; Luhmann, Ishida, & Hajcak, 2011). As a consequence,
OTU appears to have practical utility for predicting and modify- Disorders 41 (2016) 5–21
ing transdiagnostic symptoms, individual differences, measurable
behaviours, and decisions.
6.7. Factorially distinct
Research exploring FOTU, as reﬂected by IU,  as factorially
independent from other constructs has been conducted with the
Intolerance of Uncertainty short form (i.e., IUS-12; Carleton, Norton
et al., 2007). The available results have provided robust support that
FOTU is factorially distinct. The ﬁrst such study supporting facto-
rial independence was conducted by (Carleton, Sharpe et al., 2007)
using undergraduate data. There have been two subsequent pub-
lications investigating different aspects of factorial independence
for FOTU (Carleton, Thibodeau, Osborne, & Asmundson, 2012;
Carleton, Thibodeau et al., 2014). The publications used a large
sample of undergraduates and community members who provided
responses to measures of anxiety sensitivity, fear of injury or illness,
fear of negative evaluation, fear of pain, and FOTU as measured by
IU; nevertheless, independent replications appear well-warranted.
6.8. General summary
Based on the criteria for fundamental fears, AS, FNE, IIS, and
fear of death do not appear to qualify as fundamental. Fear of
pain might yet be argued as fundamental, but appears necessarily
moderated by FOTU. In any case, there appears to be substan-
tive evidence supporting FOTU as meeting the revised criteria for
being a fundamental fear. The theoretical process followed a poten-
tially defensible constituent reductionist postpositivist approach
wherein FOTU met  stringent propositional requirements that have
been developing for more than two  decades (e.g., Anderson et al.,
2015; Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Carleton, Thibodeau et al., 2014;
Reiss, 1991; Taylor, 1993). Speciﬁcally, FOTU appears (1) to be
an emotion; (2) inherent; (3) logically evolutionarily supported;
(4) continuously and normally distributed in the population;
(5) a logical reduction of higher-order constructs; (6) logically
non-derivative and irreducible; (7) able to account for variance
in higher-order constructs; and (8) factorially distinct. As such,
FOTU appears to be defensibly referred to as a fundamental fear
(Bach & Dolan, 2012; Carleton, 2012, 2016; Hong & Cheung,
2015). Accordingly, using FOTU as a foundation for a constituent
reductionist postpositivist approach to researching anxiety-related
psychopathology appears potentially appropriate per recent calls
for identifying key underlying factors for neuroticism (Barlow,
Sauer-Zavala et al., 2014; Brown & Barlow, 2009; Cuijpers et al.,
2010; Lahey, 2009).
7. The undiscovered country—implications and future
directions
Assuming acceptance of the postulates herein and before (e.g.,
Bach & Dolan, 2012; Carleton, 2012, 2016; Hong & Cheung, 2015;
Thayer et al., 2012), substantial research remains to be conducted.
The extant literature base does not yet include direct empiri-
cal assessments of FOTU. Instead, such assessments have been
made using related constructs including uncertainty, ambiguity,
and novelty. Even then, much of the research has been based
on cross-sectional designs with self-report as the primary depen-
dent variable of interest. Future research should work towards
experimental, longitudinal designs with multimodal dependent
variables. A more comprehensive description of research limi-
tations and future directions is available from Shihata, McEvoy,
Mullan, and Carleton this issue. Furthermore, additional research
can and should be conducted to test how well FOTU meets each of
the propositional requirements (i.e., the eight criteria) for identify-
ing a fundamental fear. There appears to be sufﬁcient preliminary
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upport, but each of the criteria included initial recommendations
or producing stronger evidence to support a fear as fundamental
see Table 1).
Despite the substantial neurobiological evidence (e.g.,
alderston et al., 2013; Brosschot et al., 2016; Gray & McNaughton,
003), much more remains to be conducted (see Brosschot et al.,
016; Grupe & Nitschke, 2013). Research exploring how FOTU
nteracts with automatic (Balderston et al., 2013; Cisler & Koster,
010; Leyro, Zvolensky, & Bernstein, 2010; Mathews & MacLeod,
994, 2005) and elaborated (Grenier, Barrette, & Ladouceur, 2005)
rocessing also appears well-warranted (Fergus, Bardeen, & Wu,
013). Human research could also be augmented by animal studies
xploring FOTU (e.g., Herry et al., 2007; Mishra, Logue, Abiola, &
ade, 2011).
The research to date has also focused primarily on anxiety
nd related disorders, with less research exploring depression
e.g., Nelson et al., 2014; Yook et al., 2010); however, FOTU may
mpact all psychopathology as well as normative emotions and
ecision-making (Bach & Dolan, 2012; Carleton, 2012, 2016; Hong
 Cheung, 2015). As such, researchers should further explore the
nﬂuence of fearing the unknown on depression, somatic disorders
e.g., chronic pain; Carleton & Asmundson, 2012), eating disor-
ers (Konstantellou & Reynolds, 2010; Sternheim et al., 2011), and
ersonality disorders (Berenbaum et al., 2008; Fergus & Rowatt,
014), as well as supporting normative and healthy responses.
here may  also be important differences in the impact of chronic
mall unknowns (e.g., those associated with daily hassles) and one
r more major unknowns (e.g., whether a person will pass a critical
xam).
Explicit integration of FOTU into progressive updates of estab-
ished models for psychopathologies (e.g., the shared vulnerability
odel; Asmundson, Coons, Taylor, & Katz, 2002) remains to be
onsidered. Research needs to be conducted exploring associated
eurological processes, memory, and self-awareness. There is also
esearch to be done exploring interventions – transdiagnostic and
therwise – for FOTU, building on the seminal theory by Dugas
nd Ladouceur (2000), Freeston et al. (1994), Ladouceur, Dugas
t al. (2000), as well as recent research and theory from Barlow,
auer-Zavala et al. (2014), Boswell et al. (2013), Einstein (2014),
ahoney and McEvoy (2012a), and McEvoy and Erceg-Hurn (2016).
or example, FOTU or associated constructs (e.g., IU) could be made
xplicit, rather than implicit, components of psychoeducation and
xplicit targets for exposures. The inevitability of unknowns can
lso be addressed, and patients can be provided tools to better
anage interactions with unknowns (e.g., cognitive restructuring,
mproved probability assessments, mindfulness, acceptance).
The current review and synthesis extends previous ones in sev-
ral ways (Bach & Dolan, 2012; Carleton, 2012, 2016; Hong &
heung, 2015). First, a thorough rationale has been offered for iden-
ifying fundamental fears. Second, direct progressive comparisons
ave now been made with other candidate constructs. Third, the
vailable empirical research supporting FOTU, much using IU, as
eeting the criteria for a fundamental fear has been reviewed.
verall, the result is a robust theoretical foundation, replete with
reliminary direct experimental evidence and references to exten-
ive indirect experimental evidence with IU, for exploring FOTU
s a fundamental fear underlying anxiety and neuroticism. In sum,
OTU may  also be the fundamental fear – a fear that rules all other
ears, brings them together producing anxiety, and binds them,
acilitating anxiety and neuroticism.cknowledgements
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